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ABSTRACT
More and more people are regularly using mobile and battery-
powered handsets, such as smartphones and tablets. At the
same time, thanks to the technological innovation and to the
high user demands, those devices are integrating extensive
functionalities and developers are writing battery-draining
apps, which results in a surge of energy consumption of
these devices. This scenario leads many people to often look
for opportunities to charge their devices at public charging
stations: the presence of such stations is already prominent
around public areas such as hotels, shopping malls, airports,
gyms and museums, and is expected to significantly grow in
the future. While most of the time the power comes for
free, there is no guarantee that the charging station is not
maliciously controlled by an adversary, with the intention to
exfiltrate data from the devices that are connected to it.
In this paper, we illustrate for the first time how an adver-
sary could leverage a maliciously controlled charging station
to exfiltrate data from the smartphone via a USB charging
cable (i.e., without using the data transfer functionality),
controlling a simple app running on the device—and with-
out requiring any permission to be granted by the user to
send data out of the device. We show the feasibility of the
proposed attack through a prototype implementation in An-
droid, which is able to send out potentially sensitive informa-
tion, such as IMEI, contacts’ phone number, and pictures.
1. INTRODUCTION
Market studies stated that on 2011 smartphone sales have
surpassed that of desktop PCs [1]. To this date, smartphones
remain the most used handheld devices. This is partly due
to the fact that these devices are more powerful and provide
more functionalities than the traditional feature phones. As
a result, users can perform a variety of tasks on an actual
smartphone device, which in the past would have been pos-
sible only on a desktop PC. In order to carry out such tasks,
the smartphone platform offers its users a plethora of appli-
cations (apps).
Moreover, as users are constantly using apps (e.g., the
gaming app, Poke´mon Go) and would eventually require to
recharge their smartphones, the demand for public charging
stations have increased significantly in the last decade. Such
stations can be seen in public areas such as airports, shop-
ping malls, gyms and museums, where users can recharge
their devices for free. In fact, this trend is also giving rise
to a special type of business1, which allows shop owners to
install charging stations in their stores so as to boost their
sales by providing free phone recharge to shoppers.
As the phone recharge is for free, however, one cannot be
sure that the public charging stations are not maliciously
controlled by an adversary. The Snowden revelations gave
us proof that civilians are constantly under surveillance and
nations are competing against each other by deploying smart
technologies for collecting sensitive information en mass. In
our work, we consider an adversary (e.g., manufacturers of
public charging stations, Government agencies) whose aim
is to take control over the public charging station and whose
motive is to exfiltrate data from the user’s smartphone once
the device is plugged into the station.
We demonstrate the feasibility of using power consump-
tion (in the form of power bursts) to send out data over a
Universal Serial Bus (USB) charging cable, which acts as a
covert channel, to the public charging station. We imple-
mented a proof-of-concept app, PowerSnitch, that can send
out bits of data in the form of power bursts by manipulating
the power consumption of the device’s CPU. Interestingly,
PowerSnitch does not require any special permission from
the user at install-time (nor at run-time) to exfiltrate data
out of the smartphone over the USB cable. On the adver-
sary’s side, we designed and implemented a decoder to re-
trieve the bits that have been transmitted via power bursts.
Our empirical results show that we can successfully decode
a payload of 512 bits with a 0% Bit Error Ratio (BER). In
addition, we stress that the goal of this paper is to assess for
the first time the feasibility of data transmission on such a
covert channel and not to optimize its performance, which
we will tackle as future work.
We focus primarily on Android as it is currently the lead-
ing platform and has a large user base. However, we believe
that this attack can be deployed on any other smartphone
operating systems, as long as the device is connected to a
power source at the public charging station.
Our contributions are as follows:
1. To our knowledge, we are the first to demonstrate the
practicality of using only the power feature of USB
charging cable as a covert channel to exfiltrate data
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from a device while it is connected to a public charging
station.
2. We implemented a prototype of the attack, i.e., we
designed and implemented its two components:
• We built a proof-of-concept app, PowerSnitch, which
does not require any permission granted by the
user, to communicate bits of information in the
form of power bursts back to the adversary.
• The decoder is deployed on the adversary side, i.e.,
public charging station to retrieve the binary infor-
mation embedded in the power bursts.
We are able with our prototype to actually send out
data using power bursts. Our prototype demonstrate
the practical feasibility of the attack.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we present a brief literature overview of covert chan-
nel and data exfiltration techniques on smartphones. Sec-
tion 3 includes some background knowledge on Android and
its permission system, and signal transmission and process-
ing. Section 4 provides a description of our covert channel
and decoder design, followed by the experimental results in
Section 5 and discussion in Section 6. We conclude the paper
in Section 7.
2. RELATEDWORK
In this section, we survey the existing work in the area
of covert channels on mobile devices. We also present other
non-conventional attack vectors, such as side channel infor-
mation leakage via embedded sensors which can be used for
data exfiltration.
Covert Channels.
A covert channel can be considered as a secret channel
used to exfiltrate information from a secured environment
in an undetected manner. Chandra et al. [2] investigated
the existence of different covert channels that can be used
to communicate between two malicious applications. They
examined the common resources (such as battery) shared
between two malicious applications and how they could be
exploited for covert communication. Similar studies pre-
sented in [3, 4, 5, 6] exploited unknown covert channels in
malicious and clean applications to leak out private infor-
mation.
As demonstrated by Aloraini et al. [7], the adversary is
further empowered as smartphones continue to have more
computational power and extensive functionalities. The au-
thors empirically showed that speech-like data can be sent
over a cellular voice channel. The attack was successfully
carried out with the help of a custom-built rootkit installed
on Android devices. In [8], Do et al. demonstrated the fea-
sibility of covertly exfiltrating data via SMS and inaudible
audio transmission, without the user’s knowledge, to other
mobile devices including laptops.
In our work, we present a novel covert channel which ex-
ploits the USB charging cable by leaking information from
a smartphone via power bursts. Our proposed method is
non-invasive and can be deployed on non-rooted Android
devices. We explain the attack in more detail in Section 4.1.
Power Consumption by Smartphones.
In order to prolong the longevity of the smartphone’s bat-
tery, it is crucial to understand how apps consume energy
during execution and how to optimize such consumption. To
this end, several works [9, 10, 11, 12] have been proposed.
Furthermore, the authors from [13, 14] studied apps’ power
consumption to detect anomalous behavior on smartphones,
thus leading to detection of malware.
The existing work focus on energy consumption on the
device and our attack would therefore go undetected as the
smartphone’s CPU sends small chunks of encoded data, which
is translated into power bursts, back to the public charging
station.
Attack Vectors using Side Channel Leaks.
Modern smartphones are embedded with a plethora of sen-
sors that allow users to interact seamlessly with the apps on
their smartphones. However, these sensors have access to an
abundance of information stored on the device that can get
exfiltrated. These data leaks can be used as a side channel
to infer, otherwise undisclosed, sensitive information about
the user or device [15, 16, 17].
The authors from [18, 19] demonstrated how accelerome-
ter readings can be used to infer tap-, gesture- and keyboard-
based input from users to unlock their smartphones. Simi-
larly, Spreitzer [20] showed that the ambient-light sensor can
be exploited to infer users’ PIN input by simply observing
minor tilts and turns of the smartphones.
Keystroke inference is another type of attacks that has
been successfully demonstrated on the smartphone platform.
Cai and Chen [21] used the information collected by motion
sensors to deduce the different areas of vibrations on the
keypad. Maiti et al. [22] applied similar side channel tech-
niques on smartwatches and showed that they can capture
individual keystrokes using wrist movements. Additionally,
the authors from [23] proposed a framework that detects
and decodes keystrokes by measuring the relative physical
position and distance between each vibration. Moreover,
eavesdropping the network traffic of an Android device, it
is possible to identify the set of apps installed on a victim’s
mobile device [24, 25], and even infer the actions the victim
is performing with a specific app [26].
As pointed out in the aforementioned existing work, the
adversarial model did not require any special privileges to
exploit side channel leaks to infer data exfiltrated via sen-
sors. In this paper, we show that our custom app, Pow-
erSnitch, does not require any special permissions to be
granted by the user in order to communicate information
(in terms of power bursts) to the adversary.
3. BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE
In this section, we briefly recall several concepts that we
use in our paper about Android operating system (Section 3.1),
and signal transmission and processing (Section 3.2).
3.1 Android System and Permissions
In the Android Operating System (OS), apps are dis-
tributed as APK files. These files are simple archives which
contain bytecode, resources and metadata. A user can in-
stall or uninstall an app (thus the APK file) by directly
interacting with the smartphone. Android apps can be of
two kinds:
• GUI apps, which prompt users with a graphical user in-
terface that they can interact with.
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• Services that run in the background, independently from
user interactions, and provide a service to the user or to
other apps.
When an Android app is running, its code is executed in
a sandbox, as shown in Figure 1. In practice, an app runs
isolated from the rest of the system, and it cannot directly
access other apps’ memory. The only way an app could gain
memory access is via the mediation of inter-process com-
munication techniques made available by Android. These
measures are in place to prevent the access of malicious
apps to other apps’ data, which could potentially be privacy-
sensitive.
App sandbox
App A
Android API
Telephony Service Location service ...
App sandbox
App B
Permission enforcement
Inter-process 
communication
Private storage space
Private memory space
Private storage space
Private memory space
Camera Service
Figure 1: Two sandboxed Android apps and their interac-
tion with one another, and with the Android API.
Since Android apps run in a sandbox, they not only have
restriction in shared memory usage, but also to most system
resources. Instead, as shown in Figure 1, the Android OS
provides an extensive set of Accessible Programming Inter-
faces (APIs), which allows access to system resources and
services. In particular, the APIs that give access to poten-
tially privacy-violating services (e.g., camera, microphone)
or sensitive data (e.g., contacts) are protected by the An-
droid Permission System [27]. In fact, an app that wants
access to protected data or service must declare the permis-
sion (identified by a string) in its manifest file. The list of
permissions needed by an app is shown to the user when
installing the app, and cannot be changed while an app is
installed on the device. With the introduction of Android
M (i.e., 6.0), permissions can be dynamically granted (by
users) during an app’s execution.
The permission system has also been put in place in or-
der to reduce the damage due to a successful attack that
manages to take control of an app, by limiting the resources
that app’s process has access to. Unfortunately, permis-
sion over-provisioning is a common malpractice, so much so
that research efforts have been spent in trying to detect this
problem [28]. Moreover, an app asking for permissions not
related to its purpose (or functionality) can hide malicious
behaviors (i.e., spyware or malware apps) [29].
Our proof-of-concept app requires the wakelock permis-
sion (i.e., WAKE_LOCK) to wake and force execute the CPU
while the device is in sleep mode. Moreover, since our pro-
posed attack needs also the status of the battery and the
USB charging cable, it does not need any permission in or-
der to obtain such information, indeed it is sufficient to only
register at run-time (not even in the manifest) a specific
broadcast receiver (i.e., ACTION_BATTERY_CHANGED).
3.2 Signal Transmission and Processing
In this section, we provide some background information
on bit transmission, and signal processing and decoding used
in our proposed decoder (Section 4.4).
3.2.1 Bit Transmission
To enable bit transmission over our channel, an under-
standing of basic digital communication systems is essential.
For proof-of-concept purposes, the design of our bit trans-
mission system was inspired by amplitude-based modulation
in the digital communication literature.
Amplitude-Shift Keying (ASK) is a form of digital modu-
lation where digital bits are represented by variations in the
amplitude of a carrier signal. To send bits over our channel,
we used On-Off Signaling (OOS), which is the simplest form
of ASK where digital data is represented by the presence and
absence of some pulse p(t) for a specific period of time. Fig-
ure 2 shows the difference between a Return-to-Zero (RZ)
and a Non-Return-to-Zero (NRZ) on-off encoding. In NRZ
encoding, bits are represented by a sufficient condition (a
pulse) that occupies the entire bit period Tb while RZ en-
coding represents bits as pulses for a duration of Tb/2 before
it returns to zero for the following Tb/2 period.
NRZ
RZ
Encoded Bits 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
Figure 2: A comparison between the Non-Return-to-Zero
(NRZ) and Return-to-Zero (RZ) On-Off Line Encoding.
On the other hand, Figure 3 shows the difference between
a unipolar and a polar RZ on-off signaling. In a polar RZ
encoding, two different conditions, different-sign pulses are
used to encode different bits(zeros/ones) while the presence
and absence of a single pulse, a positive one in our case, are
used to encode different bits.
Figure 3: A comparison between a Bipolar and a Unipolar
encoding of an RZ On-Off Signal.
For the sake of our channel design, it is safe to assume that
we can only increase the power consumption of a phone at
certain times and hence, are able to generate only positive
(high) bursts. Thus, a unipolar encoding seems more rel-
ative and applicable for our channel. Moreover, successive
peaks, such as the first two zeros in Figure 2, are easier to
identify, and thus decode, in the RZ-encoded signal than in
the NRZ one. This advantage of RZ over NRZ becomes es-
pecially apparent in cases where the bit period is expected
not to be restrictively fixed in the received signal whether it
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is due to expected high channel noises or lack of full control
of the phone’s CPU. Therefore, unipolar RZ on-off signaling
was used to encode leaked bits over our covert channel.
3.2.2 Signal Processing and Decoding
After choosing the appropriate encoding method to trans-
mit bits, it is also essential to think about the optimal re-
ceiver design and how to process the received signal and
decode bits with minimum error probability at the receiver
side of the channel. As known in the digital communication
literature, matched filters are the optimal receivers for Ad-
ditive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channels. We refer
the reader to Section 4.2 of [30] for a detailed proof.
Matched Filters are obtained by correlating the received
signal R(t) with the known pulse that was first used to en-
code a transmitted bit, in this case P(t) with period Tb. Af-
ter correlation, the resulted signal is then sampled at time
Tb, which means that the sampling rate equals to 1/Tb sam-
ples/seconds. This way, each bit is guaranteed to be repre-
sented by only one sample. The decoding decision will then
be made based on that one sample value; if the sample value
is more than a given threshold, this indicates the presence
of P(t); and hence a zero in our case, while a sample value
below the threshold indicates the absence of P(t) and hence
a one is decoded.
However and most importantly, for matched filters to work
as expected, it is essential to have fixed bit period Tb through-
out the entire received signal. If the periods of the received
bits were varying, the matched filter samples taken with the
1/Tb sampling rate will not be as optimal and representative
of the bit data as expected and synchronization will be lost.
Since there exist infrequent phone-specific, OS-enforced
conditions that can affect the power consumption of a phone,
the noises on our channel are expected to be more complex
to fit in an AWGN model. Hence, a matched filter receiver
is most likely not the optimal receiver for our channel. More
creative decoder design decisions are needed to maximize the
throughput of our channel and minimize the error probabil-
ity. More decoder design decisions and experimental eval-
uations are presented and discussed in Section 4.4 of the
paper.
4. COVERTCHANNELUSINGMOBILEDE-
VICE ENERGY CONSUMPTION
In this section, we elaborate on the components that make
up our covert channel attack. We begin by giving an overview
of the attack in Section 4.1. We then define the terms and
parameters for transmission in Section 4.2, followed by a de-
scription of each component of the attack: PowerSnitch app
in Section 4.3 and the energy traces decoder in Section 4.4.
4.1 Overview of Attack
In this section, we describe the attack scenario. As re-
ported in Figure 4, the attack scenario consists of two com-
ponents: the victim’s Android mobile device (sender) and
an accomplice power supplier (receiver). The mobile device
is connected to a power supplier through a USB cable in
order to recharge its battery.
The left side of Figure 4 depicts what happens after the
victim has installed our proof-of-concept app, PowerSnitch.
The app is able to exfiltrate the victim’s private information,
which gets encoded as CPU bursts with a specific timing.
Indeed, as the CPU is one of the most energy consuming re-
sources in a device, a CPU burst can be directly measured as
a peak based on the amount of energy absorbed by a mobile
device. The right side of Figure 4 illustrates how the energy
supplier is able to measure (with a given sampling rate) the
electric current provided to the mobile device connected to
the public charging station. Then, such electric measure-
ment, which is considered as a signal, is given as input to a
decoder.
In our proposed covert channel attack, we consider situ-
ations in which users connect their mobile devices for more
than 20 minutes. There are several scenarios that fulfill such
time requirements, for e.g., recharging a device while wait-
ing at the airport or shopping. In addition, we argue that
those time requirements are more than reasonable since gen-
erally, 72% of charging time is more than 30 minutes, with
an average time of 3 hours and 54 minutes, as reported in
the study of [31]. This means that the mobile device is in
stand-by mode and that its CPU and other energy consum-
ing resources (e.g., Wi-Fi or 3/4g data connection) usage
is limited only to the OS and background apps. Moreover,
since there is not any user interaction, it is reasonable to
assume that the phone screen, which has a relevant impact
on energy consumption, will stay off for the aforementioned
period of time.
Moreover, it is also worth noting that the attack is still
feasible if there is no data connection between the victim’s
device and the power supplier, such as Media Transfer Pro-
tocol (MTP), Photo Transfer Protocol (PTP), Musical In-
strument Digital Interface (MIDI). This is possible as our
methodology only requires power consumption to send out
the power bursts. Moreover, from Android version 6.0, when
a device is connected via USB, it is set by default to “Charg-
ing”mode (i.e., just charge the device), thus no data connec-
tion is allowed unless the user switches on data connection
manually. This improvement in security feature does not
impact our proposed attack as we do not make use of data
connection to transfer the power bursts.
PowerSnitch
App
Victim’s Android 
Mobile Device
Victim’s private 
Information
Decoder 
Public Charging 
Station Controlled 
by the Adversary
Victim’s private 
Information
Electric power supplied
USB cable
Victim’s private 
Information
Figure 4: The schema of the components involved in the
attack.
4.2 Terminology and Transmission Parameters
In this section, we define the necessary terminology to
identify concepts used in the rest of the paper:
• Payload is the information that has to be sent from the
device to the receiver.
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• Transmission is the whole sequence of bits transmitted
in which the payload is encoded.
In order to obtain a successful communication, the sender
and the receiver need to agree on the parameters of the
transmission.
• Period is the time interval in which is transmitted a bit.
• Duty cycle is the ratio between burst and rest time in a
period Tb. For example, if a burst lasts for Tb/2 the duty
cycle will be 50%.
• Preamble is the sequence of bit used to synchronize the
transmission. Usually a preamble is used at the begin-
ning of a transmission, but it can also be used within a
transmission in order to recover the synchronization in
case of error. In our case, we used a preamble composed
of 8 bits.
4.3 PowerSnitch app: Implementing the At-
tack on Android
The first component of our covert channel we discuss is
the proof-of-concept which we called PowerSnitch. This app,
used covert channel exploit, has been designed as a service
in order to be installed as a standalone app or a library in a
repackaged app. Henceforth, we refer to both these variants
simply with the term “app”.
PowerSnitch only requires WAKE_LOCK permission and does
not require root access to work. The WAKE_LOCK permission
is necessary to wake up the CPU while the phone is in deep
sleep mode so that it can start to transmit the payload. We
stress that as it is running as a background service, Power-
Snitch app still works even when user authentication mech-
anisms (e.g., PIN, password) are in place. Moreover, since
it does not use any conventional communication technology
(e.g., Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, NFC), PowerSnitch app can exfil-
trate information even if the device is in airplane mode. In
this proof-of-concept, we are able to input payload, period
and other transmission parameters (see Section 4.2) to the
PowerSnitch app via an intent from an external app enabled
with a Graphic Unit Interface (referred to as GUI app), as
depicted in Figure 5.
(a) Permission required. (b) GUI app.
Figure 5: Screenshots of the PowerSnitch in Android 6.0.
In Figure 6, we illustrate the modules of PowerSnitch app.
It is composed of three modules: the Payload encoder, Trans-
mission controller and Bursts generator. The Payload en-
coder module takes the payload that has to be transmitted
and gives as output an array of bits. The payload can be
any element that can be serialized with an array of bits. As
a proof-of-concept, we use a string as payload, which is first
decomposed into an array of characters and then, using the
ASCII code of each character, into an array of bits. Payload
Encoder can also add to its output array synchronization
bits (such as the preamble), and for error check and recov-
ery (e.g., CRC).
PowerSnitch App
Bursts generator
Payload encoder
Battery/Cable/Screen 
status
Android System 
Broadcast intents
Transmission controller
Start / stop service 
(optional)
Module Signals / intents Input parameters
Payload
Period (ms)
Legend:
Figure 6: The modules involved in the PowerSnitch app.
The Transmission controller module is in charge of mon-
itoring the status of the device in order to understand when
it is feasible to transmit through the covert channel. Indeed,
in order to not be detected by the user, it will check whether
all the following conditions are satisfied:
• The USB cable has to be connected.
• The screen has to be off.
• The battery has to be sufficiently charged (see Section 6).
If it receives a broadcast intent from the Android OS that
invalidates one of the aforementioned conditions, Transmis-
sion controller module will interrupt the transmission. It is
worth noticing that to obtain all this information, Power-
Snitch app does not need any additional permission. From
this GUI app, we are also able to start or stop Power-
Snitch app (represented in Figure 6 with a dotted arrow).
The last component is Bursts generator module. The task
of this module is to convert the encoded payload into bursts
of energy consumption. These bursts will generate a signal
that can be measured at the other end of the USB cable (i.e.,
power supplier). In order to obtain these bursts of energy
consumption, Bursts generator module can use a power con-
suming resource of the mobile device such as CPU, screen or
flashlight. In our proof-of-concept, Bursts generator module
uses the CPU. A CPU burst is generated from a simple float-
ing point operation repeated in a loop for a precise amount
of time (comparing the current timestamp with the one at
the start of the loop at each iteration).
4.4 Analysis of Energy Traces
To make better decoder design decisions, several channel
traces were observed, collected and then used to calculate
channel estimations and implement different simulations of
the channel performance and behavior. As explained in Sec-
tion 3, a standard on-off signaling decoder needs to know
the exact period of bits in the received signal in order to
be able to decode them. However, a channel built based on
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a phone’s power consumption is expected to have harder-
to-model noises that, after examining the collected channel
data traces, are actually affecting not only the peak periods
but also the peak amplitudes. The amount of external power
consumed by a phone can actually be largely affected by
dominant OS-enforced, manufacturer-specific factors such as
different sudden drop patterns in power consumption espe-
cially when the phone is almost or completely charged, lack
of control over the OS scheduler; when, how often and for
how long do some heavy power-consuming OS background
services run, as well as the precision and sampling rate of
the power monitor on the receiver side of the channel.
Figure 7: A portion of a received signal showing the varia-
tions in peak widths and amplitudes.
Figure 7, for instance, shows a portion of the channel
data captured after a transmission of ten successive bits
(ten Zeros, therefore ten peaks) was initiated by our app
on a Nexus 6 phone. It should be noted that the data was
passed through a low-pass filter to get rid of harsh, high fre-
quency noises in order to make the signal looks smoother.
As a result, based on a threshold of 100mA, ten peaks are
successfully detected. Moreover, the width of each peak,
and hence the period of each bit, is varying sufficiently. The
first bit, for example, has a period of 300ms while the eighth
one has a period of only 195ms. Although the intended bit
period generated and transmitted by the app was 500ms,
the average period of the received bits was actually 311ms,
which the receiver has no way to predict in advance. Such
variations in the received signal are expected to affect the
performance of any decoder. As we explained in Section
3.2.2, an ideal matched filter receiver will have hard time
decoding such inconsistent signal and synchronization will
be lost very quickly. We elaborate further on this issue in
the remaining sections.
4.4.1 Decoder Design
In this section, we provide additional explanation about
the different processing stages that our decoder is taking the
received signal through in order to overcome the channel
inconsistencies and decode the sent bits with the minimum
Bit Error Ratio (BER). In signal processing, the quality of
a communication channel can be measured in terms of BER
(represented as a percentage), which is the number of bit
errors divided by the total number of transmitted bits over
the channel. Channels affected by interference, distortion,
noise, or synchronization errors have a high BER.
The processing stages will be discussed in the order they
take place in, along with some background information and
algorithm justifications, where applicable.
Data Filtering.
First, the received signal is passed through a low-pass filter
to get rid of the harsh high-frequency noises. For instance,
Figure 8 shows the same portion of a received signal before
and after applying the low-pass filter. The low-pass filter
helps not only to make the signal looks smoother, but also
to make the threshold-based detection of real peaks easier by
eliminating narrow-peak noises that can be falsely identified
as real peaks or bits. Additionally, the low-pass filter used
in our decoder adjusts its pass and stop frequencies based
on the intended bit period generated by the phone in order
to make sure that we don’t over-filter or over-attenuate the
signal.
(a) Raw received signal.
(b) Low-pass filtered received signal.
Figure 8: A portion of a received signal before and after
applying the low-pass filter.
Threshold Estimation.
The decoder detects peaks by decoding unipolar RZ on-off
encoded bits. The presence or absence of a peak (a 0 or a 1
in our case, respectively) at a certain time and for a specific
period is then translated to the corresponding bit. Peak de-
tection is usually done by setting an appropriate threshold;
anything above the threshold is a peak and anything below
is just noise. However, deciding which threshold to use is
not a trivial process especially with the unpredictable noise
in our channel and the variations in width and amplitude of
the received peaks.
The threshold value used by the decoder is highly critical
to peaks detection, the resulted width of detected peaks and
the decoder performance. Hence, we primarily use a known
preamble data sent prior to the actual packet to estimate the
threshold. The preamble consists of eight known bits (eight
zeros in our case) at the start of the transmission, which
means that the decoder is expecting eight peaks at the start.
Since a unipolar RZ on-off encoded zero has a pulse for half
of the bit period, the preamble is expected to have roughly
the same number of peak and no-peak samples. Therefore, a
histogram of the preamble samples is expected to split into
two portions; peak and no-peak portions. Figure 9a shows a
histogram of the preamble samples shown in Figure 9b. As
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observed, the histogram has two distinguishable densities;
each of them look like the probability density function of a
Gaussian distribution.
Estimating the parameters (mean and variance) of two
Gaussians that are believed to exist in one overall distri-
bution is a complicated statistical problem. However, the
Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM), introduced and explained
in [32], is a probabilistic model commonly used to address
this type of problem and to statistically estimate the pa-
rameters of existing Gaussian populations. To estimate the
threshold, as shown in Figure 10, the decoder uses the GMM
to fit two Gaussians to the two histogram portions, find the
mean of each one of them and then compute the threshold
as the middle point between the two means. As a result, our
decoder is able to estimate the threshold independently and
without any previous knowledge of the expected amplitudes
of the received bits. After that, each sample is converted to
either a peak sample or no-peak sample based on whether
the sample value is above or below the estimated threshold.
(a) A histogram of the preamble samples.
(b) A received preamble signal.
Figure 9: A histogram of the preamble samples shows a
mixture of two Gaussian-like densities.
Robust Decoding.
Generally, the way a decoder translates the peak and no-
peak samples to zeros and ones is highly time-sensitive. For
instance, if the bit period is fixed and equals to Tb, the de-
coder simply checks the presence or absence of the peak in
each Tb period. Since this decoding decision is made based
on a very strict timing manner, the slightest error in the
received bit periods will cause a quick loss of synchroniza-
Figure 10: Using the Gaussian Mixture Model to Estimate
the Threshold.
tion. As mentioned in the previous section, the received
peak widths (and hence bit periods) over our channel are
changing with a high variation around their mean. There-
fore, our decoding decision cannot rely on an accurate notion
of time. Instead, our decoder needs to assume a sufficient
amount of error in the period of each received bit and to
search for the peaks in a wider range instead of a strict pe-
riod of time.
To address this level of time-insensitivity and achieve ro-
bustness to synchronization errors, our decoding decision
was made based on the time difference between each two
successive peaks. As an example, assume that two succes-
sive zeros were sent and hence two peaks were received. The
difference between the start time of each peak should be
rounded to the average bit period. It should be noted that
the decoder computes the average bit period based on the
received preamble data. However, if a zero-one-zero trans-
mission was made, the time difference of the start of the two
received peaks should be rounded to double of the average
bit period. If a zero-one-one-zero transmission was made,
the difference should be rounded to triple the average pe-
riod and so on. Eventually, synchronization is regained with
every detected peak and based only on the time difference
between peaks, the decoder makes a decision on how many
no-peak bits (ones in our case) are transmitted between the
zeros. The time difference does not have to be exactly equal
to a multiple of the average bit period. Instead, a range of
values can be rounded up to the same value and thus more
flexible time-insensitive decoding decision is made.
5. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we first describe the devices used in our
experiments and the values for transmission parameters. We
then report the results of the transmission evaluation.
5.1 Experiment Settings
In our experiments, we programmed the PowerSnitch app
using Android Studio with API. The device used to measure
the energy provided to the device via USB cable is Monsoon
Power Monitor2 in USB mode with 4.55V in output. The
decoder used to process signal was implemented in Matlab.
In order to evaluate the performance of the transmission,
we send out a payload comprised of letters and numbers
of ASCII code for a total of 512 bits. The values of pe-
2www.msoon.com/LabEquipment/PowerMonitor
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riod used range from 500ms to 1000ms with increments of
100ms. It worth mentioning that bits sent over our channel
were not packeted and no error detection or correction tech-
niques were used. For each phone and bit period, BER was
computed after sending 512 bits at once and then number
of bits that were incorrectly decoded was calculated.
We evaluate the performance of our proposal on the fol-
lowing devices running Android OS: Nexus 4 with Android
5.1.1 (API 22), Nexus 5 with Android 6.0 (API 23), Nexus
6 with Android 6.0 (API 23) and Samsung S5 with Android
5.1.1 (API 22). We underline that the devices used in our
experiments are actual personal devices, kindly lent by some
users without any money reward. In order to replicate an
actual real world scenario, we did not uninstalled any app,
nor stopped any app running in background. The only in-
tervention we made on those devices is the installation of
our PowerSnitch app.
5.2 Results
In Table 1, we report the performance of decoder for pro-
cessing the received power bursts on different mobile devices.
The results presented in the table are in terms of Bit Error
Ratio (BER) in the transmission of the payload; the lower
the BER, the better is the quality of the transmission. For
Nexus devices (i.e., Nexus 4, 5 and 6), we achieve a zero
or low BER of periods of 800ms and 900ms (i.e., 1.25 and
1.11 bits per seconds, respectively). While for Nexus 4 and
6, the BER remains under 20%, for Nexus 5, it increases to
37% and 40% with periods 700ms and 600ms, respectively.
For Samsung S5, the transmission BER is at 12.5% with a
period of 1 second, and it slowly increases to around 21%
with a period of half a second.
Device
Period (milliseconds)
1000 900 800 700 600 500
Nexus 4 13.5 0.78 0.0 0.0 13.33 16.21
Nexus 5 21.0 0.0 0.95 36.82 40.35 13.4
Nexus 6 1.07 0.0 0.21 0.0 4.05 7.42
Samsung S5 12.5 13.5 13.31 16.33 17.9 21.42
Table 1: Results in terms of Bit Error Ratio (BER) as per-
centage.
The higher BER for Nexus 5 (i.e., periods 700ms and
600ms in Table 1) are due to de-synchronization of the sig-
nal that the decoder was not able to recover. To cope with
this problem, we can divide the payload into packets, where
a packet header will be the preamble in order to recover the
synchronization. A quick overview of the communication
literature can show how a BER of 30% can be recovered
using a simple Forward Error Correction (FEC) technique
where the transmitter encodes the data using an Error Cor-
rection Code (ECC) prior to transmission; for example bits
redundancy or parity checks.
6. DISCUSSION AND OPTIMIZATIONS
In this section, we further discuss the results obtained in
the experimental evaluation of our proposed attack (Sec-
tion 5). In particular, we elaborate on interesting observa-
tion we made during our experiments. We also present the
optimizations that were implemented in the framework in
order to make our proposed attack more robust.
An interesting thing to notice is that, as observed in our
experiments, the level of battery affects the quality of the
transmission signal. In Figure 11, we present the amount of
electric current provided by the power supplier to a Nexus 6
during recharge (i.e., the first 35 minutes) and full battery
states (i.e., after 35 minutes). Indeed, when the level for the
battery is low (i.e., 0% to around 40%) the device consumes
a high amount of energy, and almost all of it is used to
recharge the battery.
When attempting to transmit data in the aforementioned
conditions, we discover that the bursts were not easily dis-
tinguishable. In fact, the difference in terms of energy con-
sumption between burst and rest was so small that it cannot
be distinguished from noise; thus, they can be filtered out
during the signal processing. Additionally, when the level
of the battery is increased, the amount of energy consumed
to recharge the battery gradually decreases. We observed
that when the battery level is higher than 50%, the power
bursts become more and more distinguishable. However the
best condition under which the bursts are clear is when the
battery is fully charged. Indeed, as we can notice from Fig-
ure 11, the current drops down after the battery level reaches
100%, because there is no need to provide energy to the bat-
tery anymore - except to keep the device running.
The percentages mentioned above also depends from the
power supplier power used to provide energy to the device.
In our experiments, we used Monsoon power monitor which
provides in output at most 4.55V . Due to the limitation
of such power monitor, during the recharge of devices with
fast charge technology (e.g., Samsung S5, Nexus 6 and 6P),
which are able to work with 5.3V and 2mA, the energy
consumed is almost constant until the battery is almost fully
charged. Thus, we cannot decode any signal from the energy
consumption.
In order to avoid to transmit when the receiver is not
able to decode the signal, PowerSnitch checks whether the
battery level is among a certain threshold ω. Such threshold
ω can be obtained by PowerSnitch itself, simply knowing the
model in which it is running. This information can be easily
obtained without any permission (android.os.Build.MODEL
and MANUFACTURER).
Figure 11: Electric current provided to a Nexus 6 during
recharge phase and battery fully charged.
Optimizations.
In what follows, we elaborate on the optimizations that
were implemented in order to not be detected or make the
victim suspicious. The first optimization is to keep a duty
cycle (i.e., the time of burst in a period) under 50%. During
an attack, if such optimization is not taken into account (i.e.,
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a duty cycle greater than 75%), the victim may be alerted
by two possible effects:
• the temperature of the device could increase significantly,
in a way that could be perceived by touching it.
• if the attack takes place during the battery charge phase,
the battery will take more time to recharge due to the
high amount of energy used by CPU.
However, as previously explained in Section 3.2, the duty
cycle should be 50% of period (i.e., Tb/2) in order to achieve
a RZ. Thus, the above effects are already taken care of in
our proposed attack.
Another optimization involves the Android Debug Bridge
(ADB) tool. It is possible to monitor CPU consumption
of an Android device via ADB. Hence, one may use such
debug tool to detect that something strange is happening
on the device (i.e., a transmission on the covert channel
using CPU bursts). Fortunately, PowerSnitch app could
easily detect whether ADB setting is active through Set-
tings.Global.ADB_ENABLED, once again provided by an An-
droid API.
Another optimization to PowerSnitch app would be the
ability to detect if the power supplier is an accomplice of
the attack. The accomplice has to let PowerSnitch app
know that it is listening to the covert channel by communi-
cating something equivalent to a “hello message”. In or-
der to do so, we can rely on the information about the
amount of electric current provided to recharge the battery.
Such information is made available through BatteryMan-
ager object, provided by Android API. In particular, BAT-
TERY_PROPERTY_CURRENT_NOW data field (available from API
21) of BatteryManager records an integer that represents
the current entering the battery in terms of mA.
On one hand, the power supplier can then variate the cur-
rent in output above and below a certain threshold θ with
a precise timing. As a practical and non-limiting exam-
ple, at a point in time during the recharging, the power
supplier can output current with the following behavior:
(i) below θ for t seconds, (ii)above θ for t seconds, (iii)
again below θ for t seconds and finally (iv) above θ for
good. On the other hand, since PowerSnitch app monitors
BATTERY_PROPERTY_CURRENT_NOW and knows the aforemen-
tioned behavior (along with both θ and t), it will be able to
understand that at the other end of the USB cable there is an
accomplice power supplier ready to receive a transmission.
This optimization is significant for reducing the chance to re-
main undetected, since PowerSnitch app will transmit data
if and only if it is sure that an accomplice power supplier is
listening. This optimization is not currently implemented,
but it considered as future work.
To summarize, the conditions under which the transmis-
sion of data is optimal and the chance of being detected is
lowest are as follows: the mobile device has to be charged
more than 50%, the screen has to be off, ADB tool should
be switched off (which is true by default) and the phone
must to be plugged with a USB charging cable to a public
charging station which is controlled by the adversary.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we demonstrated for the first time the prac-
ticality of using a (power-only) USB charging cable as a
covert channel to exfiltrate data from a smartphone, which
is connected to a public charging station. In order to do so,
we implemented an app, PowerSnitch, which does not re-
quire the user to grant access to permissions at install-time
(nor at run-time) on a non-rooted Android phone. Once the
device is plugged in a compromised public charging station,
the app encodes sensitive information and transmits it via
power bursts back to the station. Our empirical results show
that we are able to exfiltrate a payload encoded in power
bursts at 1.25 bits per seconds with a BER under 1% on the
Nexus 4-6 devices and a BER of around 13% for Samsung
S5. As future work, we will work on the transmitter and
decoder by extending the framework to include error correc-
tion algorithms and synchronization recover mechanisms to
lower down the Bit Error Ration of data transmission—as
this was not the main goal of this paper.
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